From: Michael Gnau (MGnauctr.pcusa.org)
Date: Wed Jul 06 2005 - 14:30:23 CDT

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>>> Alexey Toptygin <alexeytfreeshell.org> 7/6/2005 7:37:00 AM >>>
On Tue, 5 Jul 2005, Jack Lloyd wrote:

> Assuming the PRNG is any good, it shouldn't matter if an attacker can
> manipulate such timings, because (by definition) a good PRNG will still

> behave correctly even if an attacker does feed it lots of deliberately
> bad data (as long as the PRNG also has been fed with a sufficient amount

> of unguessable 'good' input as well, of course).

In the case of Linux, this still causes the estimate of how much 'good'
entropy is in the pool to be inflated. Some applications may rely on the
fact that /dev/random is backed by 'real' entropy, whereas /dev/urandom
can be pure PRNG output.

IMO, all this discussion is well and good, but it would be much more
productive for someone to settle the question empirically.

                         Alexey

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