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From: Todd Underwood (toddosogrande.com)
Date: Thu Feb 07 2002 - 15:00:36 CST

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    joel, all,

    On Wed, 6 Feb 2002, Joel Maslak wrote:
    > The fix for this requires sophisticated bounce tracking software. The
    > only real way to fix this problem is to send each recipient a message with
    > a custom-encoded FROM envelope address, such as:
    > bounce-<user-id>-<security-key>example.com
    > Where the user-id is some sort of database identifyer and the security key
    > is simply a random number kept in the database to prevent malicious
    > activity (it could also be some sort of cryptographic code). When the
    > example.com mail server receives a message to bounce-xxx-yyyexample.com,
    > it checks the security key, verifies that the bounce is a permanent
    > bounce, and deletes the user.

    it's worth noting that this is a succinct description of VERP (variable
    envelope return path), something used by ezmlm and qmail to accomplish
    exactly this--make it difficult to forge a bounce and easy to determine
    true per-recipient bounces. VERP makes handling large mailing lists
    trivial and significantly reduces this security problem.

    see http://www.lifewithqmail.org/lwq.html#verp for a good description.

    -- 
    todd underwood, vp & cto
    oso grande technologies, inc.
    toddosogrande.com
    

    "Those who give up essential liberties for temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." - Benjamin Franklin