On Sun, 6 Jan 2002, Michal Zalewski wrote:

> On Sat, 5 Jan 2002, zen-parse wrote:
>
> > Problem: URL handler allows embedded commands.
> > May allow email viruses of the Outlook kind.
>
> > http://address/'&/some/program${IFS}with${IFS}arguments&'
>
> Isn't that old news? http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/810
>
> I *can* be wrong, but it looks like it is the same problem...

Not quite, but it seems to be a related problem (ie caused by the shell
parsing what it was given).

There is some checking for metacharacters done, and if it has any, it puts
a single quote around them. However it doesn't check for another single
quote.

And then, on Sun, 6 Jan 2002, Michal Zalewski wrote:

> > Isn't that old news? http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/810 I *can* be
> > wrong, but it looks like it is the same problem...
>
> Ah ok, it is not extactly the same... they "fixed" it... still, I'm pretty
> sure I've seen it (things like '`id`') later, in 2000 or 2001 on
> BUGTRAQ...

What might work as a solution could be changing all "'"s into "'\''"s as
it does in another part of the code.

Or maybe use a popen that doesn't call a shell.

Could've been the X-Chat thing you saw, but I wouldn't be too surprised if
there were more things like that in various clients that come with URL
handlers.

-- zen-parse

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